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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
With United Russia’s brand suffering, will a party of the president’s “right 
hand” emerge?  
Make no mistake, United Russia won this week’s regional elections, and will 
therefore continue to dominate in the Duma.  Nonetheless, opposition parties 
made some inroads and voter support decreased for the party of Putin (and 
Medvedev?), and this despite a reported increase in aggressive, perhaps 
desperate, tactics by the party’s leaders to staunch support for any rivals.  (1) 
 
The election results, broadly drawn, indeed provided a victory for United Russia, 
as Pravda.Ru points out: “76 out of the 83 regions of the Russian Federation 
voted for local councils and eight regions held elections for Regional Parliaments. 
Almost half of the electorate turned out … and around half of these voted for 
United Russia.” (2) 
 
Beneath the broad brushstrokes, however, some United Russia members 
recognized that support for the party of power had weakened.  In Sverdlovsk, for 
example, United Russia polled just 40 percent of the vote, and in Irkutsk, the 
Communist Party’s candidate for mayor, Viktor Kondrashov, soundly beat his 
United Russia competition, with more than double the vote.  (3)  
 
While regional branches of United Russia responded in different ways to the 
perceived need for a strong party showing, some vote irregularities followed 
familiar, proven trails.  As the executive director of Golos, Lilya Shibanov, noted, 
"There were massive violations in Yekaterinburg, including busing voters in to 
vote en masse. Buses were used in great quantities … there was a very high 
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percentage of voting by absentee ballot." (4)  The more insidious problem with 
Russian elections now, of course, involves the restrictions on the number of 
election monitors.  As Shibanov points out, “While earlier at local elections there 
were as many as 10 to 12 observers … we now consider it good when there are 
at least three monitors.” (5) 
 
While the election results did, in fact, prove a victory for United Russia, the 
erosion of support in the electorate did not go completely unnoticed.  As Boris 
Gryzlov mused, “We need losses at a regional level so that we recognise the 
causes of these losses and then correct them.” (6) 
 
Political parties in Russia’s recent past already have developed a quirky history 
of rapid rises as the smile of the president (or prime minister) falls upon them 
with an equally sharp decline as favor evaporates:  Our Home - Russia, Russia’s 
Choice, The Rybkin bloc, Union of Right Forces, Fatherland-All Russia, Right 
Cause.  Over the years, Russia’s executive leadership has made several 
attempts to create political parties meant to support the president or government, 
on the one hand, or serve as domesticated opposition on the other.  There also 
have been a multitude of reasons for their failures.  The most likely common 
denominator would seem to stem from the inability of the parties to take 
advantage of the party system and organization left in place from the CCCP, 
most often because Russia’s regions, particularly in Yel’tsin’s era, were not 
organized along a strict enough “vertical of power” to ensure cooperation with 
“requests” from the central authorities. 
 
While Putin certainly has made strides to correct glitches in the power vertical, 
some regions still maintain independence of action.  Given the current political 
atmosphere, there may be some regions that do not feel compelled to support 
United Russia, at least until they see the outcome of what they perceive to be a 
factional rift at the center of power. 
 
 3 
It seems the regional elections last October, and the opposition walk out that 
followed, still may have repercussions for the political supporters of 
Putin/Medvedev.  The whispers of a new party forming began last fall; the recent 
regional election results certainly don’t inspire confidence in United Russia’s 
ability to deliver votes for the prime minister or president.  Perhaps there is a 
mind in the Kremlin considering the possibilities of launching a new presidential 
platform. 
 
Strangely, the rumors circulating about the creation of a new party are based on 
the remnants of a group so unpopular as to make the idea seem absurd.  
Stalwart family members, ostensibly led by former Yel’tsin (and Putin) Chief of 
Staff Aleksandr Voloshin (he, of course, was also mentor to the current 
president), apparently are considering a political comeback.  The basis for a new 
party would spring from United Russia itself.  Political clubs established within the 
party (currently there are four of them: two liberal, two conservative) were 
created with the idea of spinning new parties off from the inside.  In the fall, as 
the clubs were forming, plans to develop them into parties were put aside.  
According to Aleksei Makarkin from the Center for Political Technologies, “[T]he 
idea was abandoned for fear of United Russia disintegrating and eroding.” (7) 
 
If United Russia should falter, or if the failures, even when weighed against the 
victories, of this election cycle are deemed too great, we may witness the Kremlin 
churn out another great political party.  In addition to Voloshin, who has remained 
remarkably quiet through the early years of Medvedev’s presidency (until now), 
there is another candidate to head the new party, Yel’tsin’s daughter Tatiana 
(Dyachenko) Yumasheva.  Her blog on life among the Kremlin elite in the 1990s 
surely gives Prime Minister Putin pause, as she recounts his early days in 
Moscow.  Recent blog postings include a delightful tale of how former prime 
minister, foreign minister, head of the SVR, Yevgeni Primakov, wanted Putin fired 
when he was head of the FSB.  These are tales that are not meant to warm the 
prime minister’s heart, but how the president feels on the subject is unknown. 
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 The question remains if there is anything any Yel’tsin “Family” member might 
say, that the Russian electorate would actually want to hear.  It seems doubtful, 
but stranger things have happened in Russian politics.  Just in case, perhaps the 
Kremlin should also be prepared to create the party of the president’s “other 
hand.” (8) 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Regional Elections Give Russia's Ruling Party Food For Thought,” 15 Mar 10 
via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Ruling_Party_Heads_For_Victory_In_Local
_Elections/1983658.html; “Russian ruling party’s choice of more aggressive 
campaign tactics analyzed,” by Olga Bolotova and Aleksey Levchenko, 
gazeta.Ru website, 9 Mar 10; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 Mar 10 via Lexis-
Nexis Academic.  
(2) “United Russia Wins Russian Regional Elections,” 16 Mar 10 via 
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/16-03-2010/112615-united_russia-0.  Last 
accessed on 18 Mar 10.  
(3) In Irkutsk, the Communist candidate reportedly won 62 percent of the vote, as 
compared to the United Russia ally of 27 percent, RIA-Novosti, 16 Mar 10, 06:47 
GMT via http://www.news.az/articles/11533.  
(4) “Regional Elections give Russia’s Ruling Party Food for Thought,” Ibid.  
(5) Ibid.  
(6) United Russia Lead Dented in Elections,” by Stuart Williams, Agence France 
Presse; The St. Petersburg Times, #1556, 16 Mar 10 via 
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=30983.  
(7) “Kremlin prepares to launch a new party project,” by Tatiana Kosobokova, 
RBC Daily, 17 Mar 10; RusData Dialine – Russian Press Digest, 17 Mar 10 via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic.  
(8) “A. Voloshin Would Like to Return to Power,” Argumenty nedeli, N48, 03 Dec 
09; What the Papers Say Weekly Review, 7 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; 
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“Kremlin has more plans to set up ‘right’ right-of-center party,” by Lyudmila 
Alexandrovna, 16 Mar 10, ITAR-TASS, 4:52 PM EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic; 
“Kremlin prepares to launch a new party project,” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
Government proposes a night-time ban on alcohol sales 
On March 11, 2010, the Government Commission on Regulating the sale of 
Alcohol considered proposing a bill to ban night-time sales of strong alcoholic 
beverages, as part of President Medvedev’s anti-alcohol abuse campaign. (1) 
Currently, alcohol is available in many regions 24 hours a day for as little as 40-
50 rubles ($1.5 US) per half liter bottle of vodka. (2) According to official statistics 
cited in support of the proposed legislation, 76% of Russians regularly consume 
alcohol; more than 50% of Russian students age 11-18 regularly drink 1-6 liters 
of alcoholic beverages per week. In rural areas, the alcohol consumption rate 
exceeds 90%. Since the early 2000’s, Russia had the highest rate of children 
diagnosed with alcoholism in the world. In 2009, two intoxicated minors in 
Khabarovsk Krai killed five people that refused to loan them money for alcohol. 
(3) While some of the sources of these official statistics seem questionable, and 
the numbers somewhat inflated, it is clear that alcohol abuse in Russia is not just 
a medical problem, but a matter of national importance. 
 
President Medvedev launched an anti-alcohol campaign in 2009, when he 
claimed that the consumption rate of 18 liters of pure alcohol per year per every 
man, woman, and child was having a profound degenerative impact on the 
country’s gene pool. (4) The goals of the campaign are to promote a healthy 
lifestyle and to reduce alcohol consumption by 55% by 2020 through measures 
such as implementing criminal liability for violations of the rules of the alcohol 
trade, more efficient tax policies, and advertisement restrictions. (5) Chief 
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Narcologist Yevgeny Bryun even proposed including directions for use with 
alcoholic beverages. (6) The President suggested reducing the size of beer 
bottles from 0.5L to o.33L; tripling beer excise taxes; and setting a mandatory 
minimum vodka price at 89 rubles ($3 US) per 0.5L bottle. Nevertheless, the 
volume of vodka sales continues to grow, while beer sales decline. This is 
partially due to an inconsistent tax policy, while the beer excise tax has tripled, 
excise taxes for strong alcoholic beverages rose only 10-13%. (7) 
 
Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on Health Nikolai Gerasimenko claims 
that the analysis of the international statistical data compels the conclusion that 
the level of alcoholism in society depends directly on the level of accessibility of 
alcohol through factors such as price, time, and location of sales. (8) The 
Government Commission on Regulating the sale of Alcohol is considering bills 
that propose reducing the accessibility of alcohol through measures such as a 
ban on nighttime, morning, and weekend sales; raising excise taxes; increasing 
penalties for sales to minors; and reducing the number of liquor stores. Notably, 
the Commission decided not to rush with its proposal until a better assessment of 
the regional practices, some of which are even stricter than those considered by 
the Government Commission, has been conducted. (9) 
 
Chechnya has the strictest alcohol laws; retail sales are allowed only for two 
hours a day, from 8-10 am. Certain Islamic villages in Dagestan prohibit sales of 
all alcoholic beverages during any time of day or night. These are the extreme 
cases. St. Petersburg has a more typical regime – beverages with an alcohol 
content of 15% or more by volume cannot be sold from 11pm - 7am. Generally, 
the regions have reported an overall positive experience with alcohol restrictions. 
The Government of Ulyanovsk Oblast’ maintains that tightening its alcohol policy 
has decreased instances of drunk driving by 19%, and that alcohol poisoning 
occurrences are down 18%. The office of the District Attorney of Sverdlovsk 
Oblast’, a region that permits alcohol sales 24 hours per day, reported that the 
vast majority of domestic murders occur late at night and that the perpetrators 
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are intoxicated. Public health experts and officials insist that a night-time alcohol 
sales ban should cover all, and not just strong, alcoholic beverages. 
Businessmen oppose the ban; Komi Republic retailers stated that their revenues 
have fallen by one third since the ban was enacted. “For many shops, alcohol 
and tobacco sales are simply a matter of survival, which in turn makes possible 
to sell bread, milk and other unprofitable groceries,” commented Andrei Popov, a 
minimarket chain owner. (10) 
 
Citizens were polled on what anti-alcohol abuse measures they would support. 
Most (63%) would support setting the minimum drinking age at 21 years old. The 
second most popular measure is prohibiting all advertisement of alcoholic 
beverages (57%); the third is promotion of a healthy lifestyle (47%). Only 10% of 
those polled supported total prohibition of alcohol. (11) President Medvedev 
agrees that Russia’s alcohol problem cannot be solved by drastic measures, “We 
have erred like this numerous times already, always with pitiful results, both for 
the people and the state.” (12) Nevertheless, the Commission did consider the 
possibility of reinstating the state monopoly on alcohol, but decided against such 
measure. First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov explained that monopolizing 
the alcohol market would require the state to buy privately held assets, which is 
prohibitively expensive, and further that the state would not likely be an efficient 
monopolist. (13) Attempts to monopolize the sale of alcohol, especially vodka, 
have been made before, even though no anti-alcohol campaigns had been 
initiated since 1987. (14) 
 
It appears that the Government may be using exaggerated figures to justify its 
proposals now, and likewise might use creative statistics to prove the campaign’s 
success in the future. Nevertheless, the need to mitigate the damage from 
Russia’s alcohol problem is clearly present. It is refreshing to see that the state 
did not undertake drastic measures, but rather reviewed historical mistakes, 
regional practices, and competing interests. “Perhaps this is the first time the 
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state has demonstrated a comprehensive and balanced approach to regulating 
alcohol market,” commented First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov. (15) 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “First Deputy Prime Minister of Russian Federation V.A. Zubkov conducted a 
hearing of The Government Commission on Regulating Alcohol Market,” The 
Government of Russian Federation Official Website, 11 Mar 10 via 
http://government.ru/ru/docs/9706/. 
(2) “Russians are taught to stock up on vodka,” Gazeta nedelya, 11 Mar 10 via 
http://www.weekjournal.ru/rubric/20/news/7226.htm. 
(3) “Explanatory note to the draft Federal Law ‘On amendment of certain 
legislative acts of Russian Federation pertaining to enhancing the prevention of 
sales of alcoholic products and beer to minors,’” The Duma Official Website via 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(ViewDoc)?OpenAgent&work/dz.nsf/ByID&1
CDF2DAB9C676510C3257647003E8A48. Last accessed 16 Mar 10.  
(4) “Medvedev will conduct a conference on questions of fighting alcoholism,” 
RIA-Novosti, 12 Aug 09 via http://www.rian.ru/society/20090812/180567690.html. 
(5) “State regulation of alcohol market in Russia. Reference,” RIA-Novosti, 1 Mar 
10 via http://www.rian.ru/spravka/20100301/211538267.html. 
(6) “Alcohol must be sold with instructions – Chief Narcologist of RF,” RIA-
Novosti, 25 Dec 09 via http://www.rian.ru/ny10_news/20091225/201386273.html. 
(7) “Russians are taught to stock up on vodka,” Gazeta nedelya, Ibid. 
(8) “Beer versus vodka,” RIA-Novosti, 10 Mar 10 via 
http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20100310/213390038.html. 
(9) “First Deputy Prime Minister,” The Government of Russian Federation Official 
Website, Ibid. 
(10) “Nigh-time alcohol sales ban: regions are still stricter than the center,” RIA-
Novosti, 12 Mar 10 via http://www.rian.ru/society/20100312/213857587.html. 
(11) “WCIOM: State Duma without beer – waste of money,” WCIOM Official 
Website, 21 Dec 09 via http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/item/single/12939.html?no_cache=1&cHash=e6a8045a1a. 
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(12) “Medvedev will conduct a conference,” RIA-Novosti, Ibid. 
(13) “Government of RF rejected a bill on state monopoly on spirits,” RIA-
Novosti, 5 Mar 10 via http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100305/212431638.html. 
(14) “Anti-alcohol campaigns in USSR and Russia. Reference,” RIA-Novosti, 12 
Aug 09 via http://www.rian.ru/society/20090812/180618477.html. 
(15) “The Government of RF will work out the question of time of alcohol sales,” 
RIA-Novosti, 11 Mar 10 via http://www.rian.ru/society/20100311/213615805.html. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Nevsky Express mastermind dead? 
Early in February, FSB forces in Dagestan claimed a major anti-terrorist success 
during a special operation, with the death of Mokhmad Mokhamad Shakhban, 
aka Seyf Islam, reputedly the founding father of Al-Qaeda’s Caucasus networks. 
(1) A month later, the FSB announced that it had achieved a second major 
success in the North Caucasus. 
    
On March 3, FSB Special Forces descended on the village of Ekazhevo in 
Ingushetia. In the ensuing firefight, eight militants were killed and ten captured. 
(2) According to the FSB’s statement on the operation, one of the individuals 
killed was Aleksandr Tikhomirov, aka Said Buryatsky. (3)  
    
Born in Siberia, Tikhomirov converted to Islam at the age of 15, and 
subsequently traveled to Egypt and Yemen as a student, where he fell in with 
radical circles. Upon his return to the Russian Federation some time during 2008, 
he joined Doku Umarov’s circle, allegedly trained suicide bombers, and became 
one of the leading online pro-Jihadi preachers in the North Caucasus. (4) 
Tikhomirov is believed to have masterminded several marquee operations, such 
as the Nazran police station bombing in August 2009 that killed 25 people, (5) 
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and the derailing via explosive device of the Nevsky Express between St. 
Petersburg and Moscow in November of the same year. (6)  
    
Russian authorities claim that Tikhomirov’s birth name was unknown to them 
until his death, and that he was being hunted under his Muslim nom de guerre. 
(7) The FSB has been careful to note that his identity has yet to be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. During the siege of Ekazhevo, Tikhomirov 
barricaded himself inside a house, where he recorded a “final sermon” onto a 
cell-phone video camera, moments before his death. It is not yet known precisely 
how he died: what is known is that the body was badly burned, (8) and that the 
head of the corpse was “severely damaged, practically absent.” (9) Although a 
passport in his birth name was found alongside the body, the FSB has sent the 
remains to a DNA laboratory to confirm identity, (10) a necessary precaution 
because Tikhomirov apparently has attempted to fake his own death a number of 
times in the past, presumably to avoid capture. (11)  
    
FSB Chief Alexander Bortnikov has claimed that the Ekazhevo operation was the 
final act of a three month-long investigation into the Nevsky bombing by his 
agency, during which sufficient evidence was unearthed to link Tikhomirov’s 
group to the atrocity. These suspicions apparently were confirmed by further 
evidence found at the scene. (12) The nature of this evidence has not been 
announced. 
    
Tikhomirov/Buryatsky’s role in the Nevsky bombing is less relevant than the fact 
that his death provides significant political benefit to the Kremlin and the FSB. 
Given his identity as one of the chief ideologues of “paramilitary gangsters” 
(13)—to use President Ramzan Kadyrov’s language, Tikhomirov’s death (if 
confirmed by DNA analysis) would constitute a major anti-terrorist coup, albeit a 
short term one, for the hydra is sure to grow another head. 
 
Borders update arctic; Nord-Stream; Angola 
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In March 2009, Russia’s National Security Strategy explicitly addressed the 
question of the Arctic, which is believed to harbor natural resources (specifically 
oil) on a level to rival the reserves in the Caspian Sea. The Security Strategy 
defined Russia’s Arctic regions as Border Zones, and ordered the FSB’s Border 
Guard Service to assume responsibility for their security. (14)   
    
In mid-February, Vyacheslav Dorokhin, First Deputy Head of the Border Guards 
announced plans to deploy an automated monitoring system throughout the 
Arctic by the end of this year. (15) The FSB also plans to increase patrols by 
Coast Guard vessels, and to build several “supermodern” bases or complexes on 
islands throughout the Northern Sea Route. (16)  
    
Dorokhin’s announcement was the first of a series of three by the Border Service, 
which also has revealed that it is assuming responsibility for guarding the Nord-
Stream gas pipeline—a task that apparently is not “especially difficult.” (17) The 
Border Service moreover is to assume the task of training and equipping 
Angola’s Border Service, an assignment reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s proxy 
excursions into Africa during the Cold War. (18) 
 
FSKN demands more resources 
In late February and early March, Viktor Ivanov, Chief of Russia’s State Anti-
Narcotics Committee (FSKN), made a series of public and private speeches. 
Ivanov used each of these events as a podium to address a number of key 
topics. First on the agenda was the issue of narcotics trafficking into Russia. 
Perhaps not surprisingly (given that Russian authorities will use any stick with 
which to beat Tbilisi), Ivanov alleged that smugglers are increasingly using 
Georgia, specifically the ports of Batumi and Poti, (19) as transit points into 
Russia. According to Ivanov, FSKN seized a total of 211 tons of Afghan heroin in 
the North Caucasus Federal Districts last year (20); approximately seven tons of 
heroin seized had been shipped via Georgia. (21) Russia’s southern borders are 
particularly vulnerable: narcotics traffickers are recruiting “guest workers” from 
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the Central Asian Republics as “drug couriers,” (22) and are using land routes via 
Azerbaijan, particularly Baku-Moscow and Baku-Kiev in order to move their 
product. (23)  
    
Ivanov claimed that the FSKN is unable to counter the level of smuggling that is 
currently occurring, with its present resources. Only 35% of FSKN (presumably 
both facilities and agents) is equipped with “special technology,” and most of that 
is “outdated,” having been purchased and introduced no later than 2003. (24) In 
this regard, the FSKN apparently is in the same boat as the military and other 
intelligence agencies: it is unable to purchase the most up-to-date technologies, 
a situation made worse by the Russian military-industrial sector’s chronic lack of 
R&D know-how.  
    
While he addressed the issue of resources in a matter-of-fact manner, Ivanov 
unleashed a significant level of vitriol against NATO and the United States. 
Speaking at the FSKN’s annual collegium meeting, Ivanov argued that 
responsibility for fighting narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan had been passed, 
from the United States to NATO, and thence to the national and provincial 
authorities in Afghanistan, while the United Nations had avoided the subject 
altogether. (25) According to Ivanov the US decision to cease the destruction of 
the annual poppy crop has increased by eight-fold the “drug pressure” on Russia. 
(26)  
    
In spite of the UN’s alleged failures and evasion of responsibility in the narcotics 
question, Ivanov announced his intention to raise the issue at a meeting of the 
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, due to be held under Ivanov’s Chairmanship 
in Vienna between March 7-12th. (27) Ivanov also proposed that Afghan poppy 
production be placed on the list of “problems threatening peace and security 
worldwide” when Russia takes the chair of the UN Security Council in August. 
(28)  
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Source Notes: 
(1) “Senior Al-Qa’idah Member Killed in Russia’s Dagestan,” RIA Novosti, 3 Feb 
10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “Russia Claims the Death of its Bin Laden,” The Daily Telegraph, 8 Mar 10; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) Ibid.  
(4) “Sheikh Said Buryatsky and the Fresh Cult of the Suicide Bomber in the North 
Caucasus,” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 16 Sep 09 via 
www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5177. 
(5) “Death of Warlord Buryatsky To be Officially Confirmed by Genetic Study,” 
ITAR-TASS, 5 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(6) “Buryatsky’s Group Involved in Nevsky Express Explosion-FSB Chief,” ITAR-
TASS, 6 Mar 10: OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection 
(7) “Russia Claims the Death of its Bin Laden,” The Daily Telegraph, 8 Mar 10; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “Russia Says Burnt Body May Belong to Militant,” The New York Times, 6 
Mar 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Death of Warlord Buryatsky To be Officially Confirmed by Genetic Study,” 
ITAR-TASS, 5 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(10) “Passport in Name of Militant Leader Found After Armed Clash in 
Ingushetia,” Interfax, 5 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(11) “Death of Warlord Buryatsky To be Officially Confirmed by Genetic Study,” 
ITAR-TASS, 5 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(12) “Warlord Said Buryatsky’s Group Responsible For Nevsky Express Train 
Bombing-FSB Chief (Part 2),” Interfax, 6 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via 
World News Connection. 
(13) “Death of Warlord Buryatsky To be Officially Confirmed by Genetic Study,” 
ITAR-TASS, 5 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(14) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 11 (16 Apr 09).  
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(15) “Russia: Automated Monitoring System of Northern Seas, Arctic Being 
Deployed. Article by Vladislav Kunikov Under Rubric ‘Security; A Peek into the 
Arctic,’” Rossiyskaya gazeta Online, 16 Feb 10; OSC Translated Text via World 
News Connection. 
(16) “Russian Border Service Presents Plans for Automated Monitoring of Arctic,” 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 17 Feb 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) “Russian Coast Guard Guarantees Nord Stream Security—Chief,” Interfax 
News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Mar 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(18) “Angola, Russia Sign Agreement on Cooperation in Border Guarding,” ITAR-
TASS, 3 Mar 10 via www.itar-
tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=14881512&PageNum=0.  
(19) “Georgia’s Territory Powerful Way of Drug Trafficking to RF-Adds,” ITAR-
TASS, 27 Feb 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(20) “Drug Mafia Uses Migrant Workers to Bring Narcotics into Russia—Official,” 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 27 Feb 10; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(21) “Russia’s Top Law Enforcement Officials Discuss Caucasus Drug 
Trafficking,” Interfax News Agency, 25 Feb 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(22) “Russia’s Top Law Enforcement Officials Discuss Caucasus Drug 
Trafficking,” Interfax News Agency, 25 Feb 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(23) Ibid. 
(24) “Drug Police Under-Equipped By Two Thirds-Chief,” RIA Novosti News 
Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 27 Feb 10; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(25) “FSKN Director Criticizes UN’s Anti-Drug Trafficking Efforts,” ITAR-TASS, 3 
Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(26) “Russian Drug Control Chief Criticizes US Decision to Stop Combating 
Opium in Afghanistan (Part 2),” Interfax, 3 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via 
World News Connection. 
(27) “UN Commission On Narcotic Drugs to Discuss Drug Threat Large Scale,” 
ITAR-TASS, 7 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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(28) “Russia Will Step Up Fight Against Afghan Drug Threat During UNSC 
Chairmanship,” Interfax, 3 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Combat readiness and conscription shortfalls 
President Medvedev gave the military “satisfactory” marks on the progress that 
has been made toward reforming the armed forces during the past year. (1)  This 
rather muted praise, delivered on 5 March during a meeting of the Defense 
Ministry’s Board attended by both the army and navy, carried with it a review of 
the past year’s progress, as well as a renewed focus on upcoming tasks for 
2010.  The “satisfactory” marks are generous, considering the questionable 
readiness of the new brigades and the failure of the contract service program. 
 
Brigade readiness 
In February 2010, two months after completely restructuring the army into 85 
brigades General Makarov stated, “All these brigades are in constant readiness, 
they [are] ready to perform the task set to them within one hour.” (2)  This is a 
grand, forward-looking statement by the Chief of Staff, considering that some 
commanding officers do not know what to do with a brigade. (3)  Even if 
commanders know what to do with the new brigades, the ground forces are still 
institutionalizing the change.  According to the new commanding officer of the 
ground troops, General Postnikov, “[Only] the outer cover of the new staffing 
structure has been created to date.  It is now necessary to perfect it.” (4) 
 
In addition, the new brigades are not fully equipped with modern equipment. (5)  
President Medvedev described the modernization shortfall in the armed forces 
command, control and communications systems as “unfortunate” and ordered 
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the new systems to be in place before 2012. (6)  Given the challenges and 
shortfalls, it is not surprising that General Makarov would later acknowledge 
during the Ministry of Defense’s Collegium that, “60% of the newly formed 
brigades are not combat ready.” (7)  Another factor that may be affecting 
readiness is the failure of the military’s contract soldier program. 
 
Contract soldier program failure 
In late February, General Makarov stated that the military had made “many 
mistakes” in building a contract-based force. (8)  As a result, the armed forces 
decided to cut the current contract soldier program by 90%. (9)  The military will 
begin anew to generate a force of both contract and conscript soldiers. (10)  This 
time, the military plans to recruit its contract personnel from those soldiers 
completing their initial year of conscript service. (11)   The goal is to obtain a 
more qualified recruit with the right “life experience.” (12)  The recruits would then 
enter specialized training for two and half years to become professional 
sergeants. (13) 
 
After completing this program, the newly trained non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) would return to their operational units.  The Russian military will expect 
the new corps of professional NCOs to be capable of replacing a junior officer in 
the field. (14)  Although the process will take time, Russia plans to build its 
contracted professional sergeants through this new program.  
 
The ramifications of the failed contract service program may generate serious 
concern among the public and the military.  First, Russia has a serious 
demographic problem with just 740,000 men (approximately) coming of military 
age each year. (15)  If officers are to fill around 150,000 positions and contract 
soldiers another 200,000 positions, Russia will need to draft roughly 600,000 
soldiers each year.  Adding to the problem, the number of draft dodgers has 
reached record levels, cresting the 100,000 mark. (16)  According to reports, in 
Moscow alone, there are at least 45,000 draft dodgers. (17)   Given both the 
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declining birth rate and the habitual draft dodging, future Russian drafts may 
leave the military seriously understaffed.  
 
The second problem is time.  Even if the military begins to train its first 
professional sergeant today, this training will not be completed until the fall of 
2012.  Consequently, it will take years to staff the armed forces fully with trained 
contract sergeants and even more time to institutionalize the professional NCO 
corps. 
 
Finally, the prospect of increasing the number of personnel selected for the draft 
each year will not be popular among Russians.  In a recent poll, 57% of Russians 
would not want a family member to serve in the armed forces and only 39% 
favored a conscript army. (18)  To make matters worse, General Makarov has 
also indicated that the military may increase a conscript’s term of service to one 
and a half years. (19)  Another option that the military is considering involves pre-
draft training conducted by DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Assistance to the 
Army, Air Force and Navy). 
 
According to Colonel-General Sergei Mayev, DOSAAF will train conscripts in “44 
military occupational specialties” this year. (20)  The outsourcing of this initial 
training presents challenges in ensuring quality control and oversight of the 
contract-training program.  In 2009, the Defense Ministry paid DOSAAF 1.5 
million rubles to train 140 conscripts. (21)  In return, the Defense Ministry 
received only 39 trained conscripts and lost over 1 million rubles. (22) 
 
Although the Defense Ministry received “satisfactory” marks from President 
Medvedev for its reform efforts, brigade readiness and conscript service will 
remain significant challenges.  In order to correct equipment shortfalls, the 
Defense Ministry plans to spend over $33 billion on new equipment over the next 
three years. (23)  By 2020, the expectation is that 70% of the brigades’ 
equipment will be modernized. (24)  
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On the personnel side, Russia’s Defense Ministry does not have any quick 
solutions.  The process of developing a professional NCO corps will take time 
and demand leadership from the current officer corps.  In light of statistics that 
suggest officers initiate one out of every three hazing incidents (25) and further 
that 1,600 officers were convicted of crimes in 2008, it is clear that Russia’s 
officer corps is failing to provide the necessary leadership. (26)  The future of 
Russia’s military modernization effort will rely heavily on the Defense Ministry’s 
ability to manage its most valuable resource, its personnel.  
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Putin in Brest, Lukashenko in Caracas 
On Tuesday, March 16, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to the 
Belarusian city of Brest to attend a regularly-scheduled session of the Russia-
Belarus Union State Council of Ministers. As part of the visit, Putin met with his 
counterpart - Belarusian Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky. In their official 
comments following the meeting, both prime ministers made statements praising 
bilateral relations between the two countries, in particular pointing out a 17% 
increase in trade over the first two months of 2010 compared with the same 
period last year, as well as reaffirming their commitment to the recently-created 
Customs Union, which also includes Kazakhstan. (1) 
 
Yet the circumstances surrounding Putin's latest visit suggest that business is not 
all as usual between the two partners of the Union State. Notably, Belarusian 
President Lukashenko did not meet with Putin. Perhaps even more significant 
than Lukashenko's absence (relations between the two, after all, have long been 
rocky) is the reason behind it. While Putin was in Brest trying to restore soured 
relations with Belarus, Lukashenko was in Venezuela, meeting with President 
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Hugo Chavez. Not surprisingly, the main topic of conversation in Caracas was 
oil. 
 
Following the meeting, it was announced that Venezuela would supply Belarus 
with 80,000 tons of crude oil daily. Belarus, for its part, would assist Venezuela in 
developing its domestic refining capabilities. (2) In addition, other forms of 
cooperation were discussed, including in the military sphere. (3) While this was 
not the first time Lukashenko has met with Chavez—the two had previously met 
in 2007, at a time when both states were at the peak of their international 
isolation—in this instance, the timing could not be more significant in terms of 
Belarus' relationship with its immediate neighbor Russia. 
 
According to some analysts, the oil agreement with Venezuela could effectively 
end Minsk's dependence on Russia for its oil needs, since the proposed daily 
import volume is comparable to the one agreed upon earlier this year with Russia 
(approximately 130,000 barrels daily). (4) Of course, there are major economic 
disadvantages in acquiring oil from Venezuela rather than Russia, particularly in 
terms of geography. Transportation costs would be much higher: not only would 
the oil have to be shipped via tanker, rather than pumped directly through a 
pipeline, but because Belarus is landlocked there is no direct way for Venezuelan 
crude to be imported: it would have to be transported overland, either through 
one of the states of the European Union, or through Russia itself, via the 
Kaliningrad region. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that cost has not yet 
come up in conversation about the Minsk-Caracas agreement. However, the 
announcement in and of itself has great symbolic significance: it shows that 
Belarus does have alternatives—even if more costly and logistically difficult—if 
Russia attempts to press its oil leverage too far. Furthermore, the timing of 
Lukashenko's visit—simultaneous with the Union State session—suggests that 
he may wish to demonstrate that Belarus will not be bound exclusively by 
regional considerations in its foreign relations. While relations with Venezuela 
need not come at the expense of those with Russia or hinder Belarus' 
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commitments to the Customs Union (whatever those may be), they may well be 
affected if Lukashenko determines that more to gain by leaning towards Caracas. 
 
Another significant aspect to Lukashenko's meeting with Chavez is that up until 
now it has been Russia (and Putin in particular) that has been considered one of 
Venezuela's main supporters outside of Latin America. In this regard, 
Lukashenko may be seen in the Kremlin as stepping provocatively on its turf - 
particularly when it comes to the issue of arms exports, an area in which Russia 
traditionally has been dominant. It is possible that Russia's recent flap with Iran 
over the S-300 contract may not have gone unnoticed by other states opposed to 
American influence - which may explain the particular enthusiasm Chavez 
demonstrated on the topic of air defense in his meeting with Lukashenko. (5) 
Whether or not the two are, in fact, related, the possible arms deal, like the 
proposed oil deal, suggests that Russia's position in a "multipolar" world might 
not be as pivotal as it might have planned. 
 
Whatever the intentions behind Lukashenko's latest moves, they appear to have 
caused Moscow to strike a more conciliatory note. Thus, while earlier in the 
Union State meeting Putin expressed disappointment with Minsk's failure to 
recognize the sovereignty of the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, he later all but reversed his stance, stating that Russia supports 
Belarus' efforts to normalize relations with Europe and that if this [Belarus' 
continued recognition of Georgian territorial integrity] is what it takes to do that, 
then Russia does not object. (6) Likewise, on the issue of oil import tariffs, Putin 
suggested that they would be abolished by the time of the full implementation of 
the Customs Union by 2012 - again, contradicting Russia's earlier position that 
duties on oil and gas imports fall outside of the Customs Union tariff regime. (7) 
These apparently conciliatory gestures do not mean that Russia's desire to 
extend its influence in the Near Abroad has decreased, but they do provide some 
indication of how sensitive Moscow is to any real or perceived countermeasures 
to these efforts undertaken by its neighbors. 
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The recent trend of developments with Iran, Belarus and now Venezuela—
juxtaposed with major arms deals with France, alleged secret agreements with 
Israel and of course the "reset" policy with the United States—is beginning to 
suggest that a pattern may be emerging in Russia's foreign policy de-
emphasizing relations with so-called "rogue states," in favor of a greater 
understanding, if not closeness, with Western states - with conditions, of course. 
This new approach may appear to contradict Russia's new military doctrine, 
which names NATO expansion as Russia's main threat; however, a great deal 
depends on how that policy is understood. 
 
If the purpose of the doctrine was to warn the West to stay out of Russia's 
business when it comes to former Soviet regions, then it appears to be achieving 
that purpose quite well: for one, the results of the 2008 war in Georgia (i.e. the 
presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) have been largely accepted in the 
West, as have recent election results in Ukraine. If an "understanding" regarding 
the former Soviet states between Russia and the West were to evolve, the losers 
in this arrangement well could be both the "rogue states" that in the past have 
enjoyed Russian support, as well as the independent states near Russia that 
historically have experienced Russian domination. Seen in this light, the latest 
meeting between Lukashenko and Chavez may be part of a trend among 
regimes that have historically enjoyed Russian backing to develop closer ties 
among themselves as a stop gap, given Russia's dwindling support. Whether or 
not this trend develops or spreads, it seems the latest developments between 
Russia, Belarus, and Venezuela suggest that the familiar pattern of relations, 
which Russia has cultivated over much of its post-Soviet history, is profoundly 
changing.    
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
National champion at odds with himself 
By the end of Vladimir Putin’s second term as president in 2008, the privatization 
spree that reshaped the Russian economy during the first post-Soviet decade 
had been effectively reversed. Strategic industries were renationalized and 
reintegrated into state-controlled conglomerates—enormous entities created to 
harness the country’s most important economic sectors to its broad national 
interests. These entities were known as national champions, among which the 
petroleum industry ranked first in the government’s estimation for its power to 
advance the state’s economic and political interests in both domestic and 
international arenas. The state commandeered valuable petroleum assets and 
turned them over to national champions in the service of two key goals: first, 
state control of oil and gas exports would ensure a reliable stream of revenue for 
the government; and second, world markets would provide Russia with a 
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platform for economic recovery and return to political influence. When oil prices 
remained high, national champions like the state oil company Rosneft could 
advance Russia’s national interests and profit by the same transaction. Now 
Russia’s petroleum industry is in need of new investment to sustain production 
and the government is confronting the country’s first budget deficit in nearly a 
decade. When world oil prices collapsed, interests formerly in alignment fell into 
discord. 
 
In the last quarter of 2009, Russia set a post-Soviet record by pumping ten 
million barrels of oil a day, raising annual output by about 1.4 percent. (1) In spite 
of this recent spurt in output, concerns that the country may have achieved peak 
production persist. Oil production growth began to slow in 2005, and in 2008 it 
fell by .07 percent, the first drop in a decade. (2) These declines are due in part 
to an increase in costs associated with exploiting both mature and new oil fields. 
Major fields in West Siberia and the Volga-Urals have already begun to mature, 
making extraction from the brownfields more difficult, and thus, more costly. 
Meanwhile, greenfields in remote regions like East Siberia typically require 
sophisticated technology to exploit and lack supporting infrastructure to process 
and transport the oil once extracted, meaning that huge capital outlays will have 
to be made before the new fields can be brought fully into operation. Any 
increase in Russian oil production in 2010 depends on East Siberian greenfields 
replacing West Siberian brownfields, but without financial incentives from the 
government it is unlikely that producers will be willing to make sufficient 
investment to maximize output at these challenging deposits. 
 
Rather than risk stagnation in the country’s most promising new oil fields, last 
June Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin enacted an export tax holiday to 
spur production in East Siberia. The three-year zero export duty was designed to 
remain in effect long enough for producers to recoup investments in 13 remote 
greenfields. (3) When it was discovered that the tax break as originally fashioned 
would not extend to Rosneft’s showcase Vankor field, the largest oil project in 
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Russia’s post-Soviet history, Rosneft Chairman Igor Sechin, who also serves as 
deputy prime minister, bypassed the Finance Ministry and brought his objections 
to Prime Minister Putin. Sechin let it be known that unless Vankor was deemed 
eligible for the tax break, production at the field would be capped at half capacity. 
In January of this year the tax holiday was extended to include 22 fields, bringing 
Rosneft, TNK-BP, and Surgutneftegaz under its umbrella, whereupon Sechin 
suggested that it would take five to seven years for Rosneft to recoup its 
investment in Vankor, and that three years was too short a holiday. (4) Other 
Russian oil majors joined the chorus urging the Finance Ministry to extend the 
tax breaks to fields located outside of East Siberia. Their broadening demands 
prompted Kudrin to order a field-by-field review for eligibility, but he indicated that 
the tax holiday would remain in effect as granted. (5) 
 
Meanwhile, the state budget is suffering from anemia brought on by two years of 
economic contraction that left the country with a $77 billion deficit in 2009. (6) 
The oil industry provides an important source of revenue from export receipts, 
upon which the government relied for about 40 percent of its budget in 2008. (7) 
A decline in annual oil and gas receipts has forced the government to seek out 
new sources of revenue to narrow a gap expected to reach 7.2 percent of GDP in 
2010. (8) In spite of tight state finances, Kudrin’s prediction that the oil export tax 
holiday will cost the state budget $4 billion this year has proven unpersuasive, 
and any attempt the Finance Minister may have made to abolish the program has 
been overruled. 
 
National champions were created to serve as a primary source of export 
revenues for the government and a commercial agent charged with expanding 
Russian influence in foreign markets. While Igor Sechin may be serving the state 
in his capacity as chairman of Rosneft by expanding into East Asian markets, his 
threat to limit production at Vankor field, Russia’s main source of oil destined for 
the Chinese market, suggests a willingness to consider profits ahead of 
contractual obligations. Certainly, there is nothing objectionable in the profit 
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motive of a businessman. The chairman of a national champion, on the other 
hand, is expected to adhere to a different standard, yet Sechin’s concern for 
Russia’s state interests is nowhere in evidence. 
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